Jamie Tunsley: The Lib Dem nuclear plans are M.A.D.

Jamie Tunsley is a recent Politics and International Relations graduate from the University of Nottingham, he writes as a freelancer. 

At the Liberal Democrat Spring Party Conference, Ed Davey announced plans to decouple the UK’s nuclear deterrent from the US. This means that under a Lib Dem government, the Trident missiles will be maintained in the UK and will be replaced in the mid-2040s by a new, independent delivery system. With the ‘Special Relationship’ already in a fragile state, a pledge to end nuclear cooperation would cause irreparable damage to the partnership on both sides of the Atlantic.

This article uses institutionalist theory – a series of ‘rules, practices, and narratives’ that shape the interactions between states – to understand how the ‘Special Relationship’ retains its value through a diverse range of institutional suppliers.

Therefore, the UK-US relationship does not draw its strength from the alignment between its leaders, but it is instead strengthened by having a variety of smaller, yet equally critical, partnerships that gives the alliance its special quality, including intelligence, the private sector, and the armed forces. Therefore, detaching the nuclear component of the ‘special relationship’ would tear apart this unique bond between both nations, bending the backbone of the Trans-Atlantic relationship to breaking point.

The nuclear component of this relationship has for long existed, with British scientists collaborating on the Manhattan Project. Since the 1960s, the UK has purchased inter-continental ballistic missiles (Polaris and Trident) from the US for use in its submarines. Lockheed Martin is responsible for conducting critical maintenance where needed. While the warheads on top of the missiles are British, there were some aeroshells procured from the Americans to make up for a shortfall.

The strength of UK-US nuclear cooperation has spread into the private sector. Links exist between Rolls Royce and Westinghouse (focused on nuclear propulsion), as well as the US Electric Boat Company and BAE Systems (for constructing nuclear submarines). Nuclear cooperation has stimulated research partnerships beyond the respective governments into the private sector, ensuring both nations continue to share construction and maintenance of their respective nuclear deterrents.

It further provides economic incentives to sustain security cooperation within the supply chain. Technology exchange provides around £5bn to the UK economy, supporting around 30,000 jobs and 850 British companies. The work of private corporations is a key part of nuclear operations, providing a financial incentive while ensuring that Britain has exclusive access to the state-of-the-art American systems providing a critical advantage on the nuclear battlefield.

Taking steps to remove Britain’s nuclear collaboration would make the country more insecure in the short-term. British engineers would have to learn the skills and responsibilities to maintain the missiles, replacing the role for Lockheed Martin. The cost of finding a new private sector contractor, and the cost of delivering this vital service will be greater than the current supplier to perform the same function. Evidently, changing the terms of the Trident agreement would both threaten the quality of the deterrent, if the missiles are not properly maintained, and increase the cost on the public purse inexplicably.

Jeopardising the UK’s nuclear programme would damage the current security of NATO. The challenge of Russian aggression and the destabilisation of the Middle East requires a retrenched commitment to Trans-Atlantic security with a committed nuclear deterrent. The Lib Dems approach would threaten this, strengthening the hand of Britain’s security rivals by implying the collapse of a security partnership that has been iron-clad for half a century. The nuclear relationship within NATO offers genuine scope for British leadership, acting as a bridge between the US and non-nuclear European partners, and encouraging deeper French engagement in strategic planning, can help to retrench a universal commitment to the alliance.

The current arrangement costs 6 per cent of the UK’s defence budget, but that is significantly cheaper than the alternative. In 1960, the UK cancelled its independent missile capability, Blue Streak, despite spending £70mm (1.7bn today, or 2 per cent of the current defence budget) just conducting early-stage testing. Designing a new British capability would squeeze the current defence budget, at a time when additional spending is desperately needed for conventional forces.

Embarking on such an engineering behemoth will require Treasury complicity in a project that it cannot reasonably justify to the taxpayer when there is a cheaper alternative. The question is not if Britain could build its own capabilities, but more appropriately if it can afford to embark on a political pet project that would have limited improvements to the country’s security architecture.

Britain values the security provided by its nuclear deterrent, and through a NATO-first defence policy, wants to extend those protections to its European allies. The current collaboration with the US ensures that Britain has access to the most advanced delivery systems and ensures the highest degree of trust across the Atlantic by collaborating on the most sensitive issues.

Diverting the current course would be a costly exercise that would not provide a significant improvement in security and bring into question the future of the ‘special relationship’.