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Justice Jackson Accidentally Makes the Case for the RIGHT to Vouchers (And a Deep Dive) – Twitchy

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April 29, 2025
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Justice Jackson Accidentally Makes the Case for the RIGHT to Vouchers (And a Deep Dive) – Twitchy

Now, this is a bit of a deep cut and it requires some set up, so bear with us. Besides we are going to dive deep into last week’s oral arguments before the Supreme Court.





Last Tuesday, the Court held oral arguments in Mahmoud v.Taylor. You can listen for yourself, here…

…but the author is here to ‘Lawsplain’ it to you.

It starts in Montgomery County, Maryland. Basically it is part of what this author would call ‘greater Washington, D.C.’ meaning that while it is not technically part of the political unit known as Washington, D.C., a large percentage of the people who live in Montgomery County work in D.C.

In Montgomery County, the school district decided to push LGBTQ ideology hard during pride month a few years back, pushing their agenda on elementary schoolchildren. How hard? Well, one of the books at issue is called ‘Pride Puppy,’ and it is on the surface a book teaching the ABC’s. However, it is the ABC’s of going to a pride parade. We found this YouTuber who reads the entirety of the book to you while showing you all the pictures, and you can see it is also pushing LGBTQSUPERCALIFRAGILISTICEXPIALIDOCIOUS+ ideology on just about every page:

So this was apparently being recommended for children to learn the Alphabet on. By the way, it is not even doing that properly. When they got to the letter X, they cheated and used ‘eXhausted.’ That’s the kind of thing you do when you are presenting to people who already know the alphabet. But if you are teaching a child, you need to use a word that starts with an X.

The extra special part comes at about the 2:40 mark where the book suggests that kids find various objects in the previous pages of the book, including ‘underwear,’ ‘leather’ ‘[drag] queens’ and ‘[drag] king.’ And if you are wondering about the brackets, you will see that this is in the original, under Q and K.

This was one of many books being pushed on children with allegedly this kind of agenda, and a number of Muslim and Catholic parents objected, wanting their children to be allowed to opt out. They are the plaintiffs in the district court and the petitioners before the Supreme Court. The school district is referred to as either defendants or respondents. The parents’ brief talks more about what happened:

Public schools have long recognized the primacy of parents in instructing their children on sensitive matters of gender and sexuality. If public schools have offered such instruction at all—a recent trend—they have almost uniformly notified parents and allowed them to opt their children out. Respondents here—the Montgomery County Board of Education and its officials (the Board)—were no exception. They long allowed notice and opt-outs for any ‘instruction related to family life and human sexuality,’ along with any ‘classroom discussions or activities that [parents or students] believe would impose a substantial burden on their religious beliefs.’

But in 2022, the Board introduced a series of controversial ‘LGBTQ-inclusive’ storybooks to be read and discussed with students in pre-K through fifth grade. When hundreds of parents raised religious objections, the Board for the first time eliminated notice and opt-outs—directing administrators and teachers that parents could no longer be notified when the books were taught or be allowed to opt their children out. The Board’s own documents reveal that its goal in compelling children to participate in this instruction is to ‘disrupt’ their ‘either/or thinking’ on gender and sexuality. And the Board concedes that children may ‘come away from [such] instruction with a new perspective not easily contravened by their parents.’

In the oral argument, they discussed how teachers were directed to read these kinds of books to the class, and it included suggested talking points that teachers should give to their students. The dissent in the Fourth Circuit below provides some details on that:

Other books include stories about a planned same-sex marriage, a transgender child’s rainbow-colored wig and elementary school students deciding to replace girl/boy bathroom signs with non-binary signs.

The school board provided more than these books; it also provided materials for teachers and administrators to use in responding to questions from students. These materials indicate that if a student says ‘Being ___ (gay, lesbian, queer, etc) is wrong and not allowed in my religion,’ school officials ‘can respond’ by saying, ‘I understand that is what you believe, but not everyone believes that. We don’t have to understand or support a person’s identity to treat them with respect and kindness.’ … The materials also indicate that if a student says that ‘a girl … can only like boys because she’s a girl,’ the school employee can ‘[d]isrupt the either/or thinking by saying something like: actually, people of any gender can like whoever they like…. How do you think it would make___(character’s name)___to hear you say that? Do you think it’s fair for people to decide for us who we can and can’t like?’ … And if a student asks what it means to be transgender, the school board proposed this response: ‘When we’re born, people make a guess about our gender and label us `boy’ or `girl’ based on our body parts. Sometimes they’re right and sometimes they’re wrong…. Our body parts do not decide our gender. Our gender comes from our inside….’

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(Citations removed.) Of course, the school board’s defense is to say ‘hey, just because we told our subordinates to say it doesn’t mean they actually will say it!’ Oy vey.

Mind you, the first statement is relatively innocuous. Whatever you feel about gay people and so on, they exist and you have to figure out how to process that. The courts have long held that schools can teach children to be civil toward each other and toward adults regardless of even deep disagreements. But the other statements cross the line into promoting a particular ideology that might clash with the religious beliefs of parents. So, this group of Muslims and Catholics joined forces to seek an injunction requiring notice and an opportunity to opt out.

We’ll talk a bit more about the oral argument in a moment, but we think we have covered enough that we can get to Justice Jackson’s frankly bizarre argument that this isn’t such a problem, because after all, you don’t have to send your kid to public school!

Now, this audio is cut up from different parts of what she said, and it mostly accurately reflects her remarks … except she also noted that parents could send their children to private school as well. Which is only really true if Maryland has a regime of robust vouchers. That is, vouchers that would actually pay the tuition for many good quality private schools. This author doesn’t pretend to know if Maryland has such a voucher program, but that is what has to exist for someone to say that parents really can choose not to send their kids to public schools.

After all, the reality is that many people can’t afford the tuition for a private school, nor can they take time off of a paying job to stay home to homeschool their children. We’re not saying it’s impossible to pick those options, but it is difficult and so, as a practical matter, many parents are absolutely forced to send their children to public schools.

So, you heard it here first, folks! Justice Jackson endorses robust vouchers!

Except, of course, we all know she doesn’t. What is more likely is that she is perfectly fine with trapping the poorer kids in private schools. We say racial segregation was awful, but our schools create a very real economic segregation so that when a public school is failing, or just trying to indoctrinate your children, the wealthier parents can remove their children, while the poorer children are stuck in them. And this is all despite the fact that in the mind of Democrats, white people are always rich and everyone else is poor. In the minds of Democrats, economic discrimination is racial discrimination.

To be fair, Jackson attempts to address this by saying that the courts don’t normally concern themselves with those practical realities, citing the example of the right to counsel in a civil case. Her argument was that the courts say you have a right to a lawyer in civil cases, but many people can’t afford it and the law doesn’t care about that. Here’s her making that claim:

MR. BAXTER: Well, Your Honor, the world we live in in this case is that most parents don’t have that option. They have two working parents. They can’t afford to send to private school.

JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, as a matter of practicality, absolutely.

MR. BAXTER: And that’s the reality for our parents.

JUSTICE JACKSON: I understand. But, in so many other constitutional doctrines, we don’t focus on whether people actually can afford to protect their rights.

MR. BAXTER: Well, here, they’re forced —

JUSTICE JACKSON: In so many other doctrines —

MR. BAXTER: — they’re forced to pay for the public schooling.

JUSTICE JACKSON: No, I understand. But, usually, we set aside and we say: But you still have the right to get an attorney in a civil case even if you can’t afford it, right? So we don’t focus on whether or not they can actually do it. They have an option.

Except that really doesn’t work as a metaphor. What happens with Maryland schools is what we are pretty sure happens in most places in America. First, taxpayers are all required to pay for public schools even if they have no children and can never have children. Second, children are required by law to go to public schools, and often the method of punishment for truancy is to lock up the parents. Some states allow parents to homeschool their children if they can meet certain standards—and it is our understanding that Maryland allows for homeschooling. And the Constitution itself requires states to allow parents to send their children to private schools, if those schools meet certain standards. But if you can’t make those two options work, financially, you have to send your children to a public school.

For her comparison to hiring a lawyer in a civil case to work, we would have to imagine a regime where if you don’t hire a private attorney, one will be forced on you that might not even get along with you and might be prejudiced against you, and that person might have an agenda that might not line up with yours. Or you can represent yourself, but then you have to pass a test comparable to the bar exam (mimicking the strict requirements put on parents who homeschool), requiring you to essentially take time off from work to study for the exam. Only then would that situation look like the legal regime we have set up forcing most parents to send their kids to public school.





The truth is this author literally can’t think of any other situation in our society quite like this very common coerced public school regime. It’s one of a kind. Whether one agrees with the coercion or not, it is plainly coercion and Jackson is off her rocker to pretend it is not.

Indeed, G-d bless him, Justice Alito absolutely roasts the claim that parents have a choice at one point in the oral argument when responding to something the school district’s lawyer said:

Well, it’s nice that you say that they respect the parents’ religious beliefs, but, basically, your answer is it’s just too bad. … You’ve got to send … your children to school. You can’t afford to send them to any place except a public school, unlike, you know, most of the lawyers who argue cases here, they can send their children … to private schools, and they think that that’s the way most of the world is.

But it’s not. It’s just too bad.

We won’t lie. This author actually snorted when Alito made the crack about how most Supreme Court lawyers can afford private schools for their kids. There’s nothing wrong with a lawyer being wealthy, but a good lawyer remembers what it is like not to be wealthy.

Another highlight picked up by a Twitter/X user is this exchange where the lawyer for the school district isn’t exactly sure when sex ed starts for children, but its in the fourth or fifth grade.

We tend to think that sex ed has no place in anything below middle school/Junior High School.

We also admit that it was pretty funny when Gorsuch said ‘Gosh, I read it.’ As in (paraphrase) ‘don’t try to lie to me about what these books said.’ That is frankly a moment of bad lawyering, because if they can’t trust the lawyer to truthfully represent what they can see with their own eyes, they are not going to trust him on the things they can’t verify for themselves.

Barrett also rode that lawyer a bit when he tried to misrepresent the book’s contents. For instance, at one point he tried to say that they were just exposing children to these ideas about LGBTQSUPERCALIFRAGILISTICEXPIALIDOCIOUS+ which resulted in this exchange:

JUSTICE BARRETT: Well, it’s not just exposure to the idea, right? If it’s exposure — if it’s presentation of the idea as fact, that’s different, right?

MR. SCHOENFELD: I — I don’t —

JUSTICE BARRETT: It’s not just some people think. That’s — that’s exposure. Some people think X. Some people think Y.

It’s saying: This is the right view of the world. This is how we think about things. This is how you should think about things. This is like 2 plus 2 is 4.

In other words, if they said for instance, that ‘some people think that you can change your gender and some people don’t’ that’s just exposing children to an idea. But if you say ‘some people say you can’t change your gender, and those people are wrong’ then you are no longer exposing a person to an idea. This is saying this is the reality. It’s no different than telling a class full of Christians that Jesus Christ never even existed or that he was definitely fathered by a Roman soldier named Pantera rather than God, or telling a class full of Buddhists that Buddha definitely didn’t sit under a tree for over forty years. Those are not things that should be taught in school.

Later on, the same lawyer tried to say that this was about fostering respect and Barrett called him out for it on similar terms:

JUSTICE BARRETT: Well, but those [books] that I read were more than about respect. It was more about kind of what I was talking with you about before, like 2 plus 2 is 4. Like, this is how it is. You know, gender is not something that can be identified at birth, for example.

So, this was bad lawyering on the part of the school district. 

Now, you might have noticed that we haven’t said too much on the law in this area. That is because the law is kind of all over the place and, potentially, in flux.

One major precedent you have is Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). This author has been bringing up this case when talking about the radicalization of instruction for several years now and except for some typos, our analysis has aged very well:

And to an extent, this was those chickens come home to roost. While Yoder dealt with a challenge under the religion clauses of the First Amendment, and thus in theory it doesn’t apply to merely political viewpoints, in reality, the two are not always neatly separated. For instance, if a person objects to a school vilifying Israel during the current war in Gaza, is that a political opinion? Well, if you ask that person why they support Israel, you might discover they do so because they think Jews are the chosen people. Whether you agree with that particular religious view or not, there is little dispute that this would be a religious view.





Meanwhile, this author has gone on record saying that he bases his support for Israel more on the Golden Rule combined with the principles of natural law articulated in the Declaration of Independence. As in Jews, just like everyone else, have a God-given right to life (and liberty and the pursuit of happiness) and if the government cannot or will not protect that right to life, they have a right to rebel against it and put in a new government that will affirmatively protect their lives. That is precisely what happened when the Jews rebelled and created Israel. For decades, Jews were subjected to constant pograms in that part of the world and, after the holocaust, they’d had enough. Whether you agree with this analysis or this author’s principles, obviously this author is reasoning from general principles that find their roots in faith—namely the New Testament and the Declaration of Independence, which talks about rights given to us by our ‘Creator.’

And the same can be said when discussing racism. Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. once railed against moral relativism in a sermon by saying that:

I’m here to say to you this morning that some things are right and some things are wrong. (Yes) Eternally so, absolutely so. It’s wrong to hate. (Yes, That’s right) It always has been wrong and it always will be wrong! (Amen) It’s wrong in America, it’s wrong in Germany, it’s wrong in Russia, it’s wrong in China! (Lord help him) It was wrong in two thousand B.C., and it’s wrong in nineteen fifty-four A.D.! It always has been wrong, (That’s right) and it always will be wrong! … Some things are right and some things are wrong, no matter if everybody is doing the contrary. Some things in this universe are absolute. The God of the universe has made it so. And so long as we adopt this relative attitude toward right and wrong, we’re revolting against the very laws of God himself.

(The comments in parentheticals are from his congregation.) So as a practical matter, many topics that might seem secular on the surface might turn out to be driven by faith. It might be driven by a very specific passage in a holy book. Or it might be driven by moral principles that are in turn derived from faith.

The point we are getting at both today and in that old post on Twitter/X is that if indoctrination at a school becomes bad enough, parents would have the right to keep their children at home entirely under the Yoder precedent. Clarence Thomas seemed to think that this answered the question entirely in this exchange:

JUSTICE THOMAS: So the — so Yoder is a complete withdrawal of the students from school. And you say that’s not as drastic as picking and choosing certain messages that the parents don’t think their kids should hear?

MR. SCHOENFELD: Precisely.

Judging by his tone of voice, we don’t think Thomas agreed. We think that he believed just as Amish students could opt of the entirety of school, parents had a right to opt out of parts of it.

Another two cases that found themselves in the mix was Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist was fired from her job because she refused to work on Saturdays—because she believes the sabbath is on Saturday and will not work on the Sabbath. She was then denied unemployment benefits because in the eyes of the government, she could work and she was choosing not to. But she successfully argued that this would punish her for her faith, the Supreme Court holding that unless the government has a compelling reason, it cannot burden faith this way.

All of which sounds like a pretty awesome precedent, until you read Smith. In that case, a pair of Native Americans were fired from their jobs because they used peyote. The use of peyote was a crime in their state. They were then denied unemployment benefits because they could work, if they only stopped using the illegal drug. But they contended that the use of the drug was essential to their religion—much like alcohol is necessary in many Christian churches to carry out communion—and, therefore, they were being denied unemployment benefits based on an unconstitutional criminal law. Justice Scalia wrote an opinion that focused almost entirely on whether the criminal law was constitutional, but since then Smith has been read to mean that the government can enforce any law that incidentally punishes religious practices. So the government can even prevent a Catholic from using wine in communion, so long as the law banning it is neutral—that is, it bans wine generally, not just banning it for that purpose.

Now, there are several things to note about Smith, and they are a little bit interconnected.

First, it is not impossible to thread the needle between Smith and Sherbert and still say Sherbert is good law. For instance, surely if a person was fired from her job for refusing to work on a Sunday, that person would have still gotten unemployment benefits. So, if Ms. Sherbert could be effectively punished for believing that the Sabbath is on a different day from most Christians, that would not be a generally applicable rule.

Second, there has been extremely heavy criticism of Smith for several years from the right, with conservative legal scholars increasingly favoring the notion that there needs to be some accommodation of religious practices in the law. Indeed, at first the criticism of Smith was bipartisan, to the point that Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in response to that decision and numerous states passed similar laws, which basically said … what Sherbert said about making some exceptions if there isn’t a compelling purpose in the rule. It restored Sherbert not as a constitutional doctrine, but as a creature of federal or state law. Of course, the left was all for this sort of thing when they thought that only Native Americans and other people belonging to minority faiths would benefit, but they threw a fit when Christians like the people running Hobby Lobby used this law to give them an exception to Obama’s abortion mandate as part of Obamacare.





And on its merits, conservative thought leaders make a pretty good point. A moment ago, we mentioned the example of banning all alcohol, even for sacramental purposes, for a specific reason: We were hoping you would think something like ‘fat chance of that happening.’ Even when we amended the Constitution to ban alcohol in most contexts, the Congressional statute enforcing it still had an exception for communion. Even though not all Christians use wine in communion, the overwhelming majority of Christians in this majority Christian country would allow an exception in every alcohol regulation for small amount of communion wine. But on the other hand, it is easy to see how just by indifference the majority of Americans wouldn’t even think twice about banning peyote. If the religions that are sympathetic to the majority gets exceptions to laws regulating their sacramental drugs, while the sacramental drugs of less sympathetic, numerically smaller religions do not, that’s at least troubling considering what the First Amendment says.

Of course, the counter argument is … well … are you aware of how many religions there are in the world? And of course, it really isn’t hard for someone to make up a new one. Suppose someone said they had a vision and proclaimed a new religion: Escobarism. Further suppose he claims that Pablo Escobar was his savior and he communed with the lord by getting high on cocaine? We give that as one example of how religious accommodation can get out of hand because we can bet that is the kind of concern Scalia had when he wrote the majority opinion in Smith.

But increasingly the Supreme Court has latched onto the issue of neutrality, particularly relying on a case you probably haven’t heard of … and one that you probably have. The one you probably haven’t heard of is Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) where basically a bunch of people who followed Santeria wanted to open a new church in Hialeah, Florida. This religion often involves the use of animal sacrifice and people in that local community were horrified by that thought. They passed ordinances making it illegal to kill an animal for a reason other than food and making animal sacrifice explicitly illegal. So there, the Supreme Court held that because this law was not actually neutral, that the law could only be justified if it was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling purpose. And the determination that this law was motivated by a desire to target these Santeria followers was backed up by evidence outside the ordinances themselves.

And the other case you will probably know about is Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights, 584 U.S. 617 (2018). In that case, the people running a bakery were asked to make a cake for a gay wedding, and they refused, on religious grounds. The state of Colorado attempted to penalize them for that decision and the Supreme Court held in favor of the bakery. But the Supreme Court didn’t rule that a state couldn’t force a person to bake a gay wedding cake over his or her religious objections. Instead, the Supreme Court struck down the decision to penalize them by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission because the commission was clearly acting out of hostility toward the bakers’ religious beliefs. Which meant that it might be appropriate to force them to bake the cake as long as they weren’t hostile to their religion in making that decision, which is part of why the Masterpiece Cakeshop kept having to have this fight long after they ‘won’ in the Supreme Court.

The result of all of these precedents was that the Supreme Court Justices were constantly asking whether or not the officials in Montgomery County were enforcing neutral policies and whether or not officials were expressing hostility, so that they could perhaps get out from under Smith and grant these families a right to opt out of this ridiculous propaganda.

And to be blunt, there was a lot of confusion on this topic, the lawyer for the school district arguing that at one point they did allow all kinds of opt-outs for different reasons, but then they stopped doing so … coincidentally when people started wanting an opt out from this pro- LGBTQSUPERCALIFRAGILISTICEXPIALIDOCIOUS+ propaganda. But the hardest thing to defend is that apparently there still is an opt out from any of this kind of discussion, but only in health class. So when they are teaching English or literature, parents can’t opt out but when it is health class, they can? That makes no sense.

And for our money, we think Justice Gorsuch might have had the killer question of the entire discussion, when questioning the school district’s lawyer about how he had tried to ask the Supreme Court to differentiate between coercion and mere exposure. That’s when Gorsuch dropped the boom:

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Counsel — counsel, on — on — on that score, the exposure line — versus coercion line that you asked us to draw, how does that play out in — in the case of the Muhammad image for a Muslim student? I didn’t see you answer that in your brief. 

(That is how Mohammed’s name is spelled in the Supreme Court’s transcript.) In other words, what if it was an ABC book of famous religious figures and when it got to M, they used Mohammed and showed an image of him?





Now, for the record, this author believes that freedom of expression and freedom of religion adds up to your right to depict Mohammed if he or she is inclined. We even participated in a protest designed to vindicate that right … 

… but we never believed we can or should force a Muslim who is offended by a depiction of Mohammed to watch it against his or her will—except in the sense that anyone walking down the street might see something offensive, as an exercise of that other person’s freedom. But we absolutely agree that if a school is going to depict Mohammed, there needs to be an opt out.

Thus, with all of that out of the way, how did the school district respond? Listening, the lawyer seemed to stumble, claiming first that he had an answer somewhere in his briefing, and then after some stumbling, we get this:

So, if there were a book that described someone drawing an image of the Prophet Muhammad, I don’t think a parent would have the ability to object even given the religious prohibition at issue on simply being exposed to the idea that people might depict the image of the Prophet Muhammad. Being required to view the depiction of the Prophet Muhammad, in contravention of a religious objection, is being required to engage in conduct —

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Well, the child is sitting passively and the teacher’s just reading a — a storybook.

MR. SCHOENFELD: I — I think, if the storybook features the depiction of the Prophet Muhammad —

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Yes.

MR. SCHOENFELD: — that is a compulsion to engage in conduct that violates your religious belief.

But that doesn’t really work. Their objection is to being exposed to this blasphemous act. So the exposure/coercion distinction doesn’t really work.

So, based on all of this, observers think that there is a good chance that seven justices will vote require the school to provide an opt out. We guess those observers think that Kagan would be the seventh, as well as the six conservatives? Certainly, Jackson and Sotomayor want to let the school district run over these parents’ rights.

But we will note two other parts of the argument that we found interesting. We already mentioned that the school district was not particularly well-represented. Well, Alito absolutely roasted their lawyer for the inclusion of a citation to Donahoe v. Richards, a Maine state Supreme Court case from 1854 where a catholic student was required to use a King James Bible:

JUSTICE ALITO: All right. One – one last question. You — you say that history is — is on your side.

History and tradition include not only the — it stretches back to the dawn of American public education that parents can’t get opt-outs, right? That’s what history shows us?

MR. SCHOENFELD: Correct.

JUSTICE ALITO: And you — and one of the cases you cite to support that is a decision by the Maryland — the Maine Supreme Court, Donahoe versus Richards, decided in 1854?

MR. SCHOENFELD: Correct.

JUSTICE ALITO: And what was involved in that case?

MR. SCHOENFELD: That case involved a Catholic student who did not want to be required to read the King James Bible. I fully credit —

JUSTICE ALITO: She was expelled.

MR. SCHOENFELD: And she was expelled. And I fully credit that that was — that reeks of anti-Catholic bias, as this Court has recognized in other contexts.

The point in that case –

JUSTICE ALITO: I — I understand, but why did you cite that as support for the history that you think supports you?

MR. SCHOENFELD: Because —

JUSTICE ALITO: The history is that — that public schools did all sorts of things that might violate the Constitution today.

It’s a bit like arguing in front of a Japanese-American judge and arguing that the cases from the Supreme Court upholding Japanese internment supports a different exercise of government power. There are certain cases that are so repellant in the eyes of the Court that you only cite it to say we shouldn’t do that what they did and maybe the other side is trying to do so. You don’t cite a case like that as supporting you. So, again, this is bad lawyering.

Finally, we see Justice Barrett ask this question at another point:

I’m thinking about what if a teacher was transgender and the student was very respectful to the teacher but didn’t want to use the pronouns and the parents didn’t want the child to use the pronouns. Like, say, you know, call the teacher ‘Mister,’ you know, when she  was transgender — when the teacher was transgender. Same for a student in the classroom.

This was actually asked of a lawyer from the Solicitor General’s Office, which is the cadre of lawyers who represent the current administration. So, this was a Trump administration lawyer. That lawyer answered by saying that the issue there would be compelled speech, and we got the sense that Barrett felt that was the right approach.

Finally, we will note that Justice Kavanaugh, who grew up in Montgomery County, made comments along these lines:

I guess I am a bit mystified as a life-long resident of the county how it came to this.

It’s not legally significant, and honestly we think he shouldn’t have talked about it, but there you go.





On to some reactions:

The cut off text:

If it’s too burdensome to not teach some students some things never heretofore taught in public schools then it is the educational material that is at fault and it should simply be removed from the curriculum in favor of teaching the things that Americans have a common agreement are reasonable, appropriate and necessary for children to learn.

We think the schools can and should teach some basic patriotism and understanding of our system of government and the philosophy behind it. We left elementary school knowing the ideas of the Declaration of Independence and being able to recite a few words from memory and were shocked when we discovered other people couldn’t when we were in college.

And regardless of our personal feelings the Supreme Court has long said that schools can teach children to believe some things.

But we think schools should not get so far into the weeds on controversial topics.

‘We don’t need no education.’

Exactly. And for the record, in the civil rights context there was a case where a school district actually shut down all public school when they were told they had to desegregate. The courts didn’t let them get away with that.

Especially since parents can opt out of that, but not English class.

Pretty much.

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