Desired Fertility Is Too Low to Avoid Depopulation | The American Spectator

There is no consensus on why fertility rates are plunging worldwide, in both rich and poor countries alike. Theories of modernization, with advancements in health, women’s status, and economic prosperity, have often been cited by demographers and economists as factors that precipitate downward trends in fertility. 

But this model of explanation, termed by scholars the “demographic transition,” is increasingly limited. UN-designated least developed countries (LDCs) Myanmar, Nepal and Bangladesh have recently descended into sub-replacement fertility, meaning the average woman gives birth to fewer than 2.1 children. 

A more accurate explanation for the demographic winter transcends mortality rates, gender roles, and economic development. It is a testament to the power and triumph of human agency in the 21st century: The species no longer wishes to propagate itself in a manner conducive to long-term population sustainability.   

Two Is Too Few

In a 2025 survey of 14 countries comprising 37 percent of the world’s population, a United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and YouGov survey found that the most common number of children people desired was two. Some people wanted three or more, but they were mostly offset by those who wanted one or none. The sampled countries represented a diverse range of cultures and rankings on the UN’s Human Development Index. 

An average desire for just two children is not enough to maintain population stability, especially since some people don’t achieve their fertility goals due to unforeseen life circumstances, such as the inability to find a suitable partner, infertility, or financial limitations. This is known as the “fertility gap,” which is nearly one full child in the United States. Americans want 2.5 kids, on average, but the fertility rate is 1.6.  

According to the UNFPA/YouGov survey, nearly one-third (31 percent) of respondents over age 50 said they fell short of their fertility ideal while just 12 percent reported having more children than they wished.

However, fertility rates around the world typically correlate with women’s procreative aspirations. Although there is a fertility gap, women are generally quite fruitful if they say they want to have many children. If they say they want to have fewer children, they give birth less. 

New research suggests that the replacement-level fertility rate is not 2.1, but may be as high as 2.7. The 2.1 figure cited by demographers doesn’t take into account a combination of mortality rates, sex-ratio imbalances and random differences in the number of children people have. If women worldwide produced an average of 2.1 children, the human population could still decline. 

As child-bearing plummets everywhere, even in Sub-Saharan Africa, the global fertility rate (2.2) is narrowly above “replacement” level. The average woman now spawns only about two children throughout her lifetime — the commonly stated “ideal.” But the fertility rate will soon dip below 2.1, with at least 95 percent of countries projected to experience sub-replacement fertility by 2100. 

A preference for smaller family sizes can largely explain the baby bust. If women desired at least three children, fertility rates would likely hover at or safely above the 2.1 “replacement” rate, accounting for the fertility gap, instead of diving into sub-replacement territory. 

Such is the outcome of Israeli women, who say they want between three and four children, on average, and have a fertility rate of 2.9. More Israeli women want five or more children than two children. 

A preference for only two children, especially when coupled with even a slight fertility gap, will inevitably culminate in a dwindling population. 

“Up to God”

The UNFPA/YouGov survey reports that economic barriers were the top reason for people having fewer children than they would like, with 39 percent citing financial limitations. 

It’s convenient for policymakers and scholars to blame “market failure,” which implies a universal interventionist solution, but analyses of fertility surveys don’t inquire what is meant by financial limitations, particularly in rich countries. While rising housing and childcare costs are frequently discussed, more in-depth questions are necessary to explain waning fertility rates. 

To what extent are people in the developed world reluctant to make a financial tradeoff between lifestyles of consumptive leisure and the arduous task of supporting several children? As one study concluded, “shifting priorities,” not economic factors, may explain the low fertility of recent cohorts of women in the United States. 

The inability of pro-natal programs implemented in various countries, such as Canada, Poland, and Sweden, to meaningfully boost fertility rates demonstrates that most people cannot be bribed with generous payouts to have more children. How pervasive is a “keeping up with the Joneses” mentality — one that regards children as commodities only worth having if they can be provided a comfortable, upper-middle-class upbringing with pristine dental health, luxury vacations, designer apparel, and a college education?

While materialistic motives may be partially driving the reproductive recession in affluent countries, people in the developing world are certainly not playing keeping up with the Joneses — yet their fertility rates are also rapidly falling. Therefore, the global descent toward sub-replacement fertility is a deeper, more complex, and even metaphysical phenomenon that arouses profound speculations about the 21st century zeitgeist. 

In previous generations, women often replied to fertility preference surveys with non-numeric answers, such as “up to God,” which are exceedingly rare in recent years. Secularism and secular influence, even in small amounts, is associated with population stagnation and decline, but devoutly religious people have higher fertility than secular people. Among Americans who attend religious services weekly, the fertility rate has rarely dropped below “replacement” level while nominally religious and religiously unaffiliated Americans are consistently below 2.1. 

In her book Hannah’s Children, the economist Catherine Pakaluk explores why 5 percent of American women are defying birth rate trends and having at least five children. She interviews 55 college-educated women who regard having children as their highest purpose and greatest blessing. The common theme these women display is strong religious conviction and identity, which serve as inspiration for their pro-natal beliefs and self-sacrificing devotion to their children.  

What ultimately matters, in the end, is mentality — the value people place on having children and the religious and cultural forces that influence natal sentiment, regardless of the economic and social milieu. The pro-natal and non-numeric “up to God” mindset has been replaced by a global preference for smaller family sizes, with two children as the new ubiquitous ideal.  

Going Green or Going Gray? 

Some people naively celebrate the twilight of population growth, insisting that fewer humans will bring higher wages and mitigate climate change. But the world is not headed for a graceful slide down the demographic mountain — it looks much more like a hasty and steep freefall. 

As fertility rates continue to decline and deaths increasingly outpace births, countries will experience substantial population loss every generation. If South Korea’s ultra-low fertility rate of 0.7 persists, there will only be 13 grandchildren for every 100 grandparents in South Korea by 2050. 

A long-term global fertility rate of 1.2 (the current East Asian average) would result in a 90 percent reduction of the human race in just over two centuries. If fertility patterns remained constant, only 10 million humans would be on the Earth by 2500. 

Imagine the Iranian capital city of Tehran — that would be the entire world population if every woman averaged 1.2 children for approximately half a millennium. 

An aging and depopulating world means less brain power, knowledge creation, innovation, productivity, and economic growth. Governments will be incentivized to raise the retirement age and increase taxes on a shrinking workforce to support a larger elderly population. Rootless and decaying family trees, with fewer siblings, cousins, aunts, and uncles, will undermine social support networks and increase dependency on public assistance for the basic necessities of life. 

Whatever the grim consequences of prolonged sub-replacement fertility, humans have a unique capacity to adapt and overcome the most precarious situations. A graying world presents immense challenges, but we must remain optimistic and avoid becoming prophets of doom, like the neo-Malthusians of the 20th century, whose apocalyptic warnings about “overpopulation” are laughable in retrospect. 

Making children more affordable or reducing the cost of living, while nobly intentioned and vitally important, won’t solve the birth dearth. Beyond economic considerations, those who study this monumental issue should inquire why people around the globe increasingly say “two” rather than “up to God.” 

Aidan Grogan is a history PhD candidate at Liberty University, a contributor with Young Voices and the donor communications manager at the American Institute for Economic Research (AIER). His work has been published in The Daily Wire, The Federalist, Law & Liberty, RealClearMarkets and AIER’s The Daily Economy. Follow him on X @AidanGrogan. 

READ MORE:

UN Population Agency Seeks to Cover Up the Disaster They Wrought

This Is What Civilizational Suicide Looks Like

What Will the US Do When Young People Begin to Disappear?