Competing With China in the Gray Zone | The American Spectator

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief

Rapid disaster relief has been an unplanned — but welcome — element of American grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. The ability to rapidly respond to earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, and tropical cyclones with on-scene forces has made the U.S. many fast friends over the years.

This is particularly true in Bangladesh, where the highly successful operation (Sea Angel) was conducted to support that nation in the wake of a horrible tropical cyclone that killed thousands and displaced millions. Whenever I have been in Bangladesh since then, I have not been able to buy a meal when an establishment’s proprietor found out that I was a Sea Angel veteran. By contrast, the cumbersome Red Chinese bureaucracy has been traditionally slow and parsimonious in its responses. (RELATED: USAID Needs Adult Supervision, Not Extinction)

Likewise, during Operation Unified Assistance, the American response to an earthquake/tsunami disaster that rocked the Indo-Pacific region in late 2004 was a truly massive and effective effort. The Navy/Marine Corps team did much of the heavy lifting, and the opinion of America in affected nations such as Thailand and Indonesia went up exponentially. Again, Chinese reaction — when there was one — was sluggish and grudging.

This American regional presence changed during the Biden administration when Navy ship maintenance issues and a radical readjustment in the Marine Corps’ worldwide readiness posture caused the Navy/Marine Corps team to be unable to react to several natural and man-made disasters in a timely manner. This should be corrected by the Hegseth Pentagon.

Building Relations With Regional Neighbors

One of the other key strengths of American strategy in the Indo-Pacific and Oceania over the years has been the use of naval port visits to build relations. Almost invariably, during these visits, Navy and Marine Corps personnel conduct civic action activities ranging from medical and dental clinics to building schools and clean water projects. These are relatively inexpensive activities that buy us much goodwill. We ask for no payback for these activities.

Contrast this with the cynical approach of the Chinese, whose “soft power” approach almost always includes a demand for some kind of payback. The Chinese call this the “wolf warrior” approach because it has elements of intimidation when economic leverage fails. The recent Chinese live-fire exercises in the Cook Islands are an example. Perhaps it is time for the rival pack to snap back. (RELATED: China’s Threat to Taiwan: Intentions and Capabilities)

The United States needs to double down on its benign approach to soft power, particularly in Oceania, where we have traditionally deferred to our Australian allies. That was then, and this is now. The Aussies simply do not have the economic and military resources to compete alone in the Oceania region with the newly aggressive Chinese.

An integrated U.S.–Australian approach augmented by the Taiwanese is needed. The Chinese argue that the Americans are far away while they are in the neighborhood. Again, the lack of readiness in naval assets in the region hinders our effectiveness. Special Operations Forces can help here with civic action, but they lack the heavy lift capability of the Navy. (RELATED: China Ratchets Up Espionage War Against Taiwan)

Support to Allies Bullied by the Chinese

The Republic of the Philippines is a poster child here. The entire Philippine Navy is smaller than the Chinese “Coast Guard,” which routinely bullies and intimidates Philippine fishermen peacefully going about their business in waters illegally claimed by the Chinese.

While the U.S. doesn’t desire any fixed bases in the Philippines, it does need to have options to rapidly reinforce that longtime ally in the event of a crisis.

Here again, there is a potential sea-based solution. The Navy/Marine Corps team maintains a Maritime Pre-positioned Ship (MPS) squadron in Guam with a Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s worth of equipment that can have troops to man it flown in quickly from Guam, Hawaii, Australia, and the mainland U.S. This unit should be moved to Philippine waters where it can be quickly employed in a military crisis or for HA/DR. Its air group alone could deliver anti-ship missiles much more dangerous to the People’s Liberation Army Navy than the near-obsolete NEMSIS missiles that the Marine Corps is currently buying.

There is a fly in the ointment here.

The Biden administration stood by while the Marine Corps allowed the three worldwide MPS sets to atrophy to a point where none have the tanks and artillery to be useful in a military crisis, nor the heavy engineering assets that were so useful region-wide during the Unified Response. All this was done to support a revised anti-ship missile strategy called Force Design that, in six years, has radically reduced the Marine Corps’ posture as a global general purpose force in readiness in favor of creating a China-centric missile-heavy capability. (RELATED: The Marine Corps Has Gone Off the Rails)

Just as troubling is the Navy’s abysmal amphibious ship readiness posture. There is no longer assurance that there will be a continuous Navy/Marine force in the Pacific — or any other region — when an unexpected crisis arises. Fortunately, the Special Operations Command has kept its eye on the ball, but it too needs naval platforms to operate continuously in the Far East and Oceania.

The neglect of our military-industrial capability on the part of the Obama and Biden administrations bears much of the blame here, but so has poor leadership and lack of imagination on the part of the Navy and Marine Corps leadership. Perfectly good amphibious ships are rotting in retirement — or worse, being turned into razor blades and coral reefs. They may not be modern enough for high-intensity combat, but for presence missions, better is the enemy of good enough.

Likewise, the Marines need to abandon the quest for underperforming, obsolete missiles and get back to basics by acquiring modern armor, artillery, and engineering equipment that made the Corps the world’s premier 9/11 force-in-readiness.

It remains to be seen if the Trump administration can muster the political will to fix the Navy and the Marine Corps to a point where they can support Gray Zone operations as well as fighting real wars when needed.

READ MORE from Gary Anderson:

Leadership Is the Key to Fixing Our Air Traffic Control Crisis

Getting the Marine Corps Out of the Chinese Finger Cuffs

Deterrence Works in Schools Where Teachers Are Armed

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel. He was the J-3 (Director of Plans and Operations) for Operation Sea Angel and later was the G-5 (Director of Plans) for the Marine Expeditionary Force on Okinawa responsible for the Western Pacific and South China Sea