DOJ Cracking Down on CCP Espionage | The American Spectator

Ashley Tellis was recently arrested and charged with the unlawful retention of national defense information and with making unauthorized visits to government officials of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Born in India, he served in the George W. Bush administration in the National Security Council and in the Southwest Asia Strategic Planning Office. If convicted, Tellis is subject to a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment and up to a $250,000 fine. (RELATED: How Deep Is China in America’s Ballot Box?)

This is just the latest in several high-profile Chinese espionage cases prosecuted by the Department of Justice (DOJ). So far this year, the DOJ has achieved several guilty pleas, convictions, and sentencings:

This September, Michael Schena, a State Department employee, was sentenced to four years in prison for conspiring to collect and transmit national defense information to individuals working for the PRC. He met people online who he knew were working on behalf of the PRC, and provided them with sensitive U.S. government information in exchange for money. Schena met an individual at a hotel in Peru who provided him with $10,000 and a cellphone that was intended to be used to transmit information. (RELATED: How China Is Quietly Outsmarting the West)

In another instance, while at work, Schena used the cellphone he received in Peru to photograph and transmit at least four classified documents that contained national defense information and which were classified at the SECRET level. Surveillance video captured Schena again using the cellphone to photograph seven documents marked as SECRET that contained national defense information. FBI agents seized the cellphone before Schena could transmit photographs of these classified documents to his handlers and arrested Schena.

Also, this September, Yuanjun Tang, a naturalized citizen of the United States and a former citizen of the PRC, pled guilty to conspiring to act in the United States as an unregistered agent of the PRC. Tang had reported to the PRC’s principal civilian intelligence agency information about individuals participating in pro-democracy activities in the U.S., which included contact information, names, photographs, videos, and recordings. He even travelled at least three times to Macau and mainland China to meet with PRC intelligence officials. (RELATED: Digital Landmines: Beijing’s Quiet Invasion)

Tang pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring to act as an agent of a foreign government without notifying the attorney general, which carries a maximum penalty of five years in prison. Sentencing is scheduled for Jan. 29, 2026.

This August, a federal jury convicted Jinchao Wei, also known as Patrick Wei, of espionage and export violations. Wei was an active-duty U.S. Navy sailor stationed at Naval Base San Diego. While serving as a machinist’s mate for the amphibious assault ship USS Essex, Wei sent extensive information about the Essex, including photographs, videos, and information about its weapons, to a PRC intelligence officer. He also sent detailed information about other U.S. Navy ships that he took from restricted U.S. Navy computer systems. In exchange for this information, the intelligence officer paid Wei more than $12,000 over 18 months.

Wei was convicted of six counts, including conspiracy to commit espionage, espionage, and unlawful export of, and conspiracy to export, technical data related to defense articles in violation of the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Wei is scheduled to be sentenced on Dec. 1.

This July, Cadence Design Systems Inc. (Cadence), a multinational electronic design automation (EDA) technology company headquartered in California, agreed to plead guilty and pay over $140 million in total criminal and civil penalties to resolve charges that Cadence committed criminal violations of export controls by selling EDA hardware, software, and semiconductor design intellectual property (IP) technology to the National University of Defense Technology (NUDT), a PRC military-led university.

Also, this July, Chenguang Gong, a dual U.S./PRC citizen and a former engineer at a Southern California company, pled guilty to stealing trade secret technologies developed for use by the U.S. government to detect nuclear missile launches, track ballistic and hypersonic missiles, and to allow U.S. fighter planes to detect and evade heat-seeking missiles.

Gong transferred more than 3,600 files from a Los Angeles-area research and development company where he worked to personal storage devices. The files Gong transferred included blueprints for sophisticated infrared sensors designed for use in space-based systems to detect nuclear missile launches and track ballistic and hypersonic missiles, as well as blueprints for sensors designed to enable U.S. military aircraft to detect incoming heat-seeking missiles and take countermeasures, including by jamming the missiles’ infrared tracking ability.

Law enforcement also discovered that while employed at several major technology companies in the United States, Gong submitted numerous applications to “Talent Programs” administered by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC established these talent programs as a means to identify individuals with expert skills and knowledge of advanced sciences and technologies to transform the PRC’s economy, including its military capabilities. In these applications, Gong pitched ideas to produce technologies in China that were similar to those produced by his employers.

In June, Joseph Daniel Schmidt, a former U.S. Army Sergeant whose last duty post was Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM) in western Washington, pled guilty to two federal felonies: attempt to deliver national defense information and retention of national defense information. Both of Schmidt’s charges are punishable by up to 10 years in prison and a $250,000 fine.

Schmidt served in the 109th Military Intelligence Battalion at JBLM, where he had access to SECRET and TOP SECRET information. After his separation from the military, Schmidt reached out to the Chinese consulate in Turkey and Chinese security services via email, offering national defense information. Schmidt traveled to Hong Kong and provided Chinese intelligence with classified information he obtained from his military service.

In April, Korbein Schultz, a former U.S. Army intelligence analyst, was sentenced to 84 months in prison for conspiring to collect and transmit national defense information, including sensitive, non-public U.S. military information, to an individual he believed was affiliated with the Chinese government. Schultz pled guilty in August 2024.

Schultz engaged in an ongoing conspiracy to provide dozens of sensitive U.S. military documents directly to a foreign national residing in the PRC. In exchange for approximately $42,000, Schultz provided documents and data related to U.S. military capabilities, including:

• His Army unit’s operational order before it was deployed to Eastern Europe in support of NATO operations;
• Lessons learned by the U.S. Army from the Ukraine/Russia conflict applicable to Taiwan’s defense;
• Technical manuals for the HH-60 helicopter, F-22A fighter aircraft, and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile systems;
• Information on Chinese military tactics and the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force;
• Details on U.S. military exercises in the Republic of Korea and the Philippines;
• Documents concerning U.S. military satellites and missile defense systems like the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); and
• Tactics for countering unmanned aerial systems in large-scale combat operations.

This February, David C. Bohmerwald, 63, the owner of a Raleigh-based electronics resale business called Components Cooper Inc., pled guilty to attempting to export accelerometer technology with military applications to China without a license, in violation of the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA). He faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison.

Bohmerwald purchased 100 accelerometers from a U.S.-based electronics company and then attempted to export the devices to a company in China. When used for military applications, accelerometers are crucial to structural testing, monitoring, flight control, and navigation systems. The technology can help missiles fly better and measure the precise effect munitions have on structures. A license is required to export the accelerometers to China.

In addition to the above, the DOJ made a series of arrests this year, including of: 1) two Chinese nationals on allegations they illegally shipped sensitive microchips used in AI applications to China; 2) two Chinese nationals on allegations they were overseeing and carrying out various clandestine intelligence tasks on behalf of the PRC’s intelligence services; and 3) two active duty and one former U.S. Army soldiers on allegations they were involved in a theft of government property and bribery scheme, with one soldier charged with conspiring to transmit national defense information to individuals located in China.

Tellis’s high-profile arrest is just the latest in a DOJ dragnet targeting Chinese espionage. Hopefully, there will be more arrests and sentencing this year and throughout the remainder of President Trump’s term in office.

READ MORE from Steve Postal:

Surprise! Hamas Has Already Doomed Peace

To Bring Hostages Home, Israel Pays Very Steep Price

Will Hamas Blow Up Gaza Deal With Explosive Demands?