Douglas Carswell: Restore the State (Part 4): Serious reform of the Civil Service

Douglas Carswell is the President & CEO of the Mississippi Center for Public Policy. He was previously the MP for Clacton. 

This is the final part of a weekly mini series exploring how to fix the workings of the British state. You can read part one – ‘Britain’s state of dysfunction’ – here , part two – Britain needs a Department of the Prime Minister – here, and part three Judicial Reform – the six steps to restoration – here.

The UK Civil Service, while staffed by dedicated professionals, suffers from systemic inefficiencies that undermine effective governance.

Incoming ministers often struggle to build departmental teams aligned with their political priorities.  Notionally in charge of a department with many thousands of staff, a minister is typically only able to appoint – and fire – a handful of individuals.

In what sense, therefore, can they be said to run their departments as opposed to being run by their departments?

It is this, surely, that explains the persistent disconnect between the policy vision of those elected by the public and public policy implemented by officials over the past few years.

Changes to the Civil Service Management Code – the key document that outlines the terms and conditions of civil service employment, and provides the framework for the management and control of the civil service – are imperative.  However tedious the idea of civil service reform might seem, such reforms are perhaps the most critical changes any new government can make – and it is important to understand why.

To put it bluntly, the Code has been heavily influenced by career officials, and rather like the honours system, seems to favour the interests of career officials.  The Code severely limits ministers’ ability to control their departments, particularly in appointing or dismissing officials. It also permits officials to interpret ministerial intent in ways that encroach on political decision-making.

To enhance the effectiveness of public administration, the system must embrace external expertise. Alongside introducing performance-based incentives, the UK should establish a Singapore-style Staff College to equip career officials with the skills needed to deliver results.

For these reforms to succeed, an incoming administration must take office with a clear blueprint for revising the Civil Service Management Code, including draft amendments to the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, which underpins the legal framework for Civil Service management.

Delaying these changes until after taking office, or worse, struggling for months before acknowledging the need for reform, would consign the government to the long list of administrations that have faltered for much the same reason.

Previous attempts at civil service reform have been attempted.

It is instructive how they either failed to go far enough, took things in the wrong direction, or simply fizzled out.  During Tony Blair’s premiership (1997 – 2007) a number of changes were introduced to try to ensure more streamlined and strategic decision-making.  Again, between 2010 and 2015, the Coalition government introduced some changes, a number of which were reversed under Theresa May (2016-2019).

An incoming administration must insist at the outset that the Civil Service Commission present ministers with a diverse pool of candidates for Permanent Secretary, Director General, and Director roles—despite past resistance from the Commission.  Beyond granting ministers greater discretion in hiring, they must also have increased authority to dismiss officials, from Permanent Secretary downward.

From day one, ministers in a new government should also be empowered to appoint non-civil servants to key Civil Service roles. Currently, highly qualified external candidates face significant barriers to entry, and restrictive lateral transfer rules often limit ministers to selecting from underperforming candidate pools.

These changes would necessitate amendments to the Civil Service Management Code, specifically Chapters 1 (Taking up Appointment), 6 (Management and Development), 7 (Pay and Allowances), and 11 (Leaving the Civil Service).

The Civil Service Recruitment Principles require revision to remove the Civil Service Commission’s exclusive authority to define “merit” for appointments and to permit ministers to propose candidates.  The definition of “merit” should be expanded to include qualified external candidates, not preclude them simply because they did not sit a civil service exam two or three decades ago.

All this would also require changes to the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, which puts into statue the practice of making appointments to the civil service on merit and open and fair competition, but in doing so effectively precluded non-civil servants being employed in such roles, reducing ministers’ scope to appoint non-civil servants other than as Special Advisers or to a handful of short-term appointments.

To attract top talent and boost performance, the Civil Service Commission should adopt a compensation model similar to Singapore’s Public Service Division, linking civil service pay to private sector benchmarks with variable pay and progression tied to performance. This would require amending sections of the Civil Service Management Code related to the appointment and management of specialists.

To build expertise and specialist knowledge, a Staff College should be established offering a Singapore-style training program that equips civil servants with the right skills to meet modern demands. Singapore’s model demonstrates how valuing authentic expertise can strengthen the civil service overall.

“But surely, Prime Minister”, the Cabinet Secretary will perhaps say after the next election “these vital changes to the civil service are important.  But won’t they take up a lot of bandwidth?  Aren’t there more pressing problems we need to deal with first?”

Unless the next administration has a plan for civil service reform, they don’t have a plan to govern.  Prime Minister Farage or Jenrick will merely be in office, but not in power.

Until we have a government willing to deal with the Whitehall mandarinate the way Margaret Thatcher dealt with the trade unions, the decline and dysfunction will continue.