Inside a Crisis: A Former Major Crime Detective Explains Why Organisations Get It Wrong

When Steve Keogh arrived at the scene of the 7 July 2005 London bombings, he confronted conditions no planning document could have prepared him for: smoke-filled tunnels, injured passengers, and limited information about whether more attacks were imminent. As one of the first detectives on-site, he had to make immediate decisions while absorbing conflicting reports and dealing with uncertainty that shifted minute by minute.

Keogh, now Head of Corporate Training at Periculum Security Group after a 30-year career at Scotland Yard, recalls the moment vividly. “There wasn’t time to stand back and map out every option,” he said. “You prioritised what you could see, what you could hear, and what your instincts told you needed doing first.” His description aligns with research from the British Psychological Society, which shows that decision-making capacity can drop significantly when individuals face sensory overload and time pressure.

The conditions he encountered illustrate a broader truth: crises unfold in ways that are rarely orderly. They create confusion, disrupt communication, and expose the limits of even the most carefully crafted plans.

Why Traditional Models Fall Short

Many organisations use decision-making frameworks designed for day-to-day operations. Among them is the National Decision Model (NDM), widely adopted in policing and other public services. While useful for structured analysis, these models do not always reflect how people think when stress levels rise. They rely heavily on logical sequencing, yet cognitive science shows that logic is often the first casualty of acute stress.

The prefrontal cortex, responsible for planning and rational evaluation, can become impaired under pressure. Meanwhile, the amygdala accelerates emotional and fear responses, sometimes leading to instinctive reactions that conflict with documented procedures. In a corporate setting, this can translate into hesitation, over-escalation, or fixation on a single detail while overlooking the bigger picture.

Keogh saw these limitations throughout his policing career. “NDM has value, but it doesn’t mirror the chaos of a crime scene,” he said. “If the model is too abstract, people struggle to use it when their senses are overloaded and the situation keeps shifting.” His insight mirrors findings from the Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, which notes that adherence to rigid frameworks can inhibit timely judgment during rapidly changing events.

Organisations often assume their teams will follow plans precisely, but real crises demand adaptive thinking. The gap between theoretical frameworks and human behaviour during emergencies is one of the most consistent causes of flawed responses.

How Organisations Misread Crisis Behaviour

Corporate crises rarely resemble their written scenarios. Cyberattacks trigger internal conflict over communication protocols. Financial scandals surface at times when key leaders are unavailable. Supply chain failures intersect with staffing shortages or reputational issues. The Crisis Management Report 2024 found that more than 60 percent of organisations misjudge their own readiness, primarily because they underestimate how individuals behave under stress.

During high-pressure incidents, teams often face cognitive overload. Too much information—or too little—can impair judgment. Individuals may become fixated on data points that appear urgent but are ultimately irrelevant. This was seen in several publicly reported incidents where organisations delayed external communication due to internal disagreement, intensifying public scrutiny and operational damage.

Keogh notes that this fixation can be dangerous. “People sometimes cling to the first explanation that makes sense to them,” he said. “But crises rarely follow a straight line, and you have to be ready to adjust quickly.” His experience investigating major crimes, where early information is often misleading, underscores how crucial flexibility is during a crisis.

Another common problem arises when teams expect certainty before acting. Corporate cultures that reward caution can unintentionally slow responses. In contrast, crisis situations often require decisions based on incomplete information. Leaders who wait for perfect clarity may make the situation worse by allowing the problem to escalate unchecked.

Why a Different Kind of Preparation Is Needed

Many businesses treat crisis planning as a documentation task, emphasising detailed procedures and communication protocols. Yet studies from the London School of Economics show that real readiness depends far more on behavioural preparation – how individuals respond when overwhelmed, disoriented, or uncertain.

This is where lived experience, such as Keogh’s time in murder and terrorism investigations, provides insight into what effective preparation requires. He draws parallels between policing and corporate environments: both depend on teams that can absorb shock, reorient quickly, and make decisions while conditions continue to evolve. “You can’t assume the crisis will fit the plan,” he said. “What you can develop is the ability to think clearly when the plan stops helping.”

Periculum Security Group’s crisis training, including its Now, Where, How® decision-making system, draws on these lessons. Rather than focusing on specific scenarios, it emphasises structured thinking that holds up under strain. The system is built to guide leaders through ambiguity, helping them identify what matters most and act even when information remains incomplete.

This reflects a growing view among crisis researchers: organisations falter not because they lack guidance, but because they lack people who can interpret and apply that guidance under pressure. The psychological dimension – how individuals navigate fear, confusion, and responsibility – is often the deciding factor.

Rethinking How Crises Are Managed

As crises become more complex and unpredictable, organisations cannot rely solely on documented procedures or abstract models. The experiences of investigators like Steve Keogh highlight that crisis response requires more than frameworks – it requires people capable of functioning when clarity disappears.

For leaders, the critical question is shifting from “Do we have a plan?” to “Do we have people who can make good decisions when the situation becomes chaotic?”
The anatomy of a crisis suggests that the answer depends not on documentation, but on the human capacity to navigate uncertainty.