John Oxley: The ‘Special Relationship’ that’s not a unique relationship, or that special

John Oxley is a consultant, writer, and broadcaster. His SubStack is Joxley Writes.

As President Trump makes his second state visit, there is one phrase that will be heard over and over: “The Special Relationship”.

It is employed to convey some idea of mutual kinship between the United Kingdom and the United States, a unique geopolitical bond that cleaves our two nations together. It remains, however, more myth than reality, a bit of wishful thinking on behalf of our leaders – and one which can undermine our position in the world if held too tightly.

For sure, Britain and the US have much that binds us together.

We share a language and an intertwined history. The US has been a dear ally to us in times of peril. Yet the relationship has often been far more pragmatic than emotional, and it stays beholden to the superior power of the United States. Indeed, when Churchill coined the term, he would have been aware not just of the US’s great support through World War II, but also of how slow they were to come to our aid.

In the decades since, our ties with the US have resembled what people these days call a situationship – where one party is far more emotionally involved than the other. Britain has imagined itself as an equal and deep partner with the US, while often being played to the convenience of the latter. With the US currently veering back towards an isolationist, self-interested pursuit of international affairs, that feels stark once again.

In the decades since World War II, Britain has spent blood and treasure supporting US objectives. In recent memory, we joined them in lengthy, deadly and ultimately largely futile military endeavours in Afghanistan and Iraq, both wars that did little to increase British prosperity or security. Meanwhile, support for our interests in Washington has often been underwhelming.

Now that seems especially true. For all his talk of admiration for the UK, the Trump Administration has charted a course which has exposed our dependence on the US. While Britain has not suffered the worst imposition of tariffs, we are still victims of the capricious mercantilism of the world’s most significant power. Even with a bespoke deal, many British trading businesses will suffer from import charges, while we will also have to weather the global effects of any contraction.

Perhaps even more of a challenge is the indifference of Trump and the antipathy of many of those around him towards NATO. As part of the special relationship, Britain has crafted its defence programmes around an assumption that it could rely on US security guarantees. Now that seems in doubt. The US has deviated from the European nations over Ukraine, and at times, its commitment to the broader alliance seems flimsy. Once again, the power balance in the relationship appears one-sided.

The “Special Relationship” is something that is talked of more than it is experienced. The US and the UK are allies and enjoy a reasonable degree of co-operation, but it is hardly unique. US presidents have at times preferred to deal with the French or German equivalents rather than our PMs – most notably Obama’s preference for Merkel over Cameron when it came to dealing with Libya. Equally, we do not seem to enjoy the diplomatic affinity afforded to Israel in Washington, or the cultural connections Ireland benefits from. We should act accordingly.

Being realistic about the reliability of the US as a partner is vital for Britain’s future prosperity and safety. For too long, we have tried to put the US relationship on a pedestal, rather than building out alternatives. We should view the US as we do other nations, whose values and interests often align with ours, but at times deviate. Nothing more, nothing less. An important and valuable relationship, but not a special one.

In doing so, we must treat our other allies with the same enthusiasm that we have sometimes reserved for the United States. Many tended to view Brexit as a choice between Atlanticism and Europe. Really, it should mean both – improving relations not just with the traditional powers of the continent, but the emerging ones too, like a rapidly prospering Poland, and the Nordic and Baltic states which have done so much to stand up to Russian aggression. The same applies to deepening ties with Commonwealth nations and countries like Japan and Korea, which can be useful allies in further afield.

It also means reassessing our own international heft. Too much has been built on the assumption that America is always there. It is part of the reason we have retreated into a fetishisation of soft power, having outsourced our hard influence across the Atlantic. That needs to shift, with a push to build up our own capabilities, combined effectively with international partnerships. This means reinvesting in our defence and our manufacturing base, to underline our independence.

This plays into a broader challenge for our politics. Too often, on both left and right, we have intertwined ourselves too much with US affairs, to the detriment of our understanding of our own. The obsession with US political movements (and at times, the flow of money and people) has made Britain an outpost of US trends. It has often sown more confusion than insight.

At present, the risk is particularly acute for the right. As we suffered an electoral defeat and Trump emerged victorious, there is a temptation to borrow some of that thunder. Yet the US President is unpopular here, even among those on the right. Our countries are different, and so too are the issues. Emulating American conservatism, especially in its MAGA form, is likely to be a poor fit with the British electorate. Again, we might have much cultural affinity, but Britain is not America.

It is, of course, a reality that the US is the most prosperous and powerful nation in the world. America will always be important to us, and we should cultivate a good relationship with it. We should, however, also be realistic. The relationship will often be more transactional than special, more on a President’s terms than a Prime Minister’s. Usually, our interests and intentions will align, but at times they will deviate. Boosting our own power and building broad alliances provides more security than kowtowing to make this relationship more special.

Britain gains little from pretending the “special relationship” is a love affair written in the stars. It is, and always has been, a partnership of convenience—sometimes warm, sometimes cold, always weighted by the sheer gravity of American power. Recognising that is not cynicism but prudence. Our future security and prosperity depend less on sentimental talk of Anglo-American destiny than on sober calculation: investing in our own strength, nurturing a web of alliances across Europe, the Commonwealth, and Asia, and engaging with the world as it is, not as we wish it to be.

By shedding the illusion of exceptionalism, we stand a better chance of securing respect from Washington and others alike. A clear-eyed Britain, confident in itself and capable of standing tall without leaning too heavily on the United States, will prove a far more valuable ally than one lost in nostalgia.